Recent research in both the social and natural sciences has been devoted to increasing our ability to predict disasters, prepare for them and mitigate their costs. Curiously, we appear to know very little about the fiscal consequences of disasters. The likely fiscal impact of a natural disaster has not been examined before in any comparable or comparative framework. We estimate and quantify the fiscal consequences of natural disasters using quarterly fiscal and disaster data for a large panel of countries. In our estimations, we employ a panel VAR framework that is similar to Burnside et al. (Journal of Economic Theory, 2004), that also controls for the business cycle. We find fiscal behavior in the aftermath of disasters in developed countries that can best be characterized as counter-cyclical. In contrast, we find procyclical decreased spending and increasing revenues in developing countries following large natural disasters. We quantify these effects. JEL: E62, O23, Q54.
The canton of Unterwald in Switzerland is frequently ravaged by storms and inundations, and is thereby exposed to extraordinary expences. Upon such occasions the people assemble, and every one is said to declare with the greatest frankness what he is worth in order to be taxed accordingly.
(from The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, book V chapter II)
Introduction
Natural disasters have resulted in significant economic and human loss long before
Adam Smith wrote about the Unterwald. Major catastrophic events-recently the Indian Ocean tsunami, the Kashmir and Sichuan earthquakes and Hurricane Katrina-repeatedly bring the human and material cost of these crises to the forefront of public attention worldwide. Natural disasters also figure prominently in controversial discussions about global warming, especially in relation to the attendant changes in the patterns of climatic events and sea levels that are predicted to accompany such warming (IPCC, 2007) . 1 The United Nation's Integrated Regional Information Network notes, "Over the past decade, the total [number of people] affected by natural disasters has tripled to 2 billion." (IRIN, 2005) . Therefore, much research in both the social and natural sciences has been devoted to increasing our ability to predict disasters, prepare for them and mitigate their costs. Curiously, we are unaware of any research that attempts to quantify the impact of natural disasters on the public purse. We appear to know very little about the typical fiscal consequences of disasters.
In developing the EM-DAT international database on disasters, a significant research effort has gone into measuring the primary costs of disasters in terms of human lives lost, the number of people directly affected, and the damage to property and infrastructure. In a recent emerging literature, several papers have used this data to examine the determinants of these economic costs (Anbarci et al., 2005; Kahn, 2004; Raschky, 2008; and Skidmore and Toya, 2007) . Some further work has estimated the short-and long-run secondary impacts of disaster on production, productivity and output (Cavallo and Noy, 2008; Cuaresma et al., 2008; Noy, 1 Increasing levels of greenhouse gases, changing sea, land and air temperatures, rising sea levels, changing patterns of rain and snow and an unstable climate are all likely catalysts of future events.
2009; and Skidmore and Toya, 2002) . However, the likely fiscal impact of a natural disaster has not been examined before in any comparable or comparative framework.
On the expenditure side, the disaster reconstruction costs to the public may be very different than the original magnitude of destruction of capital that occurred. For example, the cost for delivering and supplying populations with both short-term survival needs and longer term reconstruction may be fraught with logistical expenses and can also lead to other macroeconomic dynamics that will have an adverse impact on the government's fiscal spending. On the other hand, it is also possible that the added reconstruction costs be lower, especially if much of the capital that was destroyed is no longer necessary, was anyway becoming obsolete, is cheaper to replace or because of wide-scale loss of life. In such cases, the fiscal spending burden may potentially be smaller (see Fengler et al., 2008 for more detail on these possibilities).
On the other side of the fiscal ledger, the impact of disasters on tax and other revenue sources has also not been quantitatively examined. To a large extent, impacts on revenue depend on the macroeconomic dynamics occurring following the disaster shock, and the structure of revenue sources (income taxes, consumption taxes, custom dues, etc.) since each may react differently in the aftermath of the disaster event.
Obtaining accurate estimates of the likely fiscal costs of a disaster is useful in enabling better cost-benefit evaluation of various mitigation programs. These should also assist foreign aid organizations and international multilateral institutions in planning and preparing their programs. Another motivation to estimate the fiscal cost is to better enable governments to directly insure against disaster losses, indirectly through the issuance of catastrophic bonds (CAT bonds), or through precautionary saving. 2 The only attempt we know of estimating the likely fiscal insurance needs of a government has been calculated for Belize (Borensztein et al., 2008) ; though whether these estimates for Belize apply elsewhere is an unexplored question.
We estimate the fiscal consequences of natural disasters using quarterly fiscal data for a large panel of countries. In our estimations, we employ a panel VAR framework that also controls for the business cycle. We find fiscal behavior in the aftermath of disasters in developed countries that can be characterized as counter-cyclical, but pro-cyclical decreased spending and increasing revenues in developing countries following large natural disasters.
Data
Our dataset includes 22 developed and 20 developing countries; only data availability restricted our sample (see the appendix for a list of countries We construct a series of standardized quarterly disaster variables which reflect the magnitude of these disasters. We aggregate the amount of direct damage from disaster events reported in the EM-DAT database for a country in a given quarter, and then divided by country's GDP from the same quarter of previous year to facilitate cross-country comparisons. In the analysis, we examine five fiscal variables: government consumption (govcon); government revenue (govrev); government payment (govpay); government cash surplus (govsurp); and government outstanding debt (govdebt). We remove seasonal effects using the X12 seasonal adjustment method and present the data as percent of GDP. Notice that the outstanding debt variable contains substantially fewer observations, and should be interpreted with caution. In addition, though the government debt is usually stated in percent of annual GDP, the debt data presented here is divided by quarterly GDP. Table 3A and 3B; in all cases we clearly reject the unit root null. The model is estimated using a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation with untransformed variables used as instruments for transformed variables. Numerical impulse-response is computed from the estimated PVAR coefficients. We perform the Monte Carlo simulation to the estimated standard errors to generate 10 th and 90 th percentiles of the distribution which will be used as a confidence interval of the impulse-response. The number of repetition is 1000 times. 
Results
Figures 1A and 1B show impulse-response dynamics of a disaster shock on the fiscal variables for developed and developing countries from the baseline model as specified in equation (1). We set the magnitude of the disaster shock to two standard deviations because we want to examine the impact of large scale disasters. We summarize the cumulative fiscal impact of a large (2 STD) natural disaster over the first six quarters in Table 4A and 4B.
For developed countries, we find that the government consumption ratio rises on impact (0.04 % of GDP) and gradually declines thereafter. The government revenue drops immediately (-1.27 % of GDP) with negative cumulative impact, despite some improvements over time. The government payment, on the other hand, increases on impact (0.46% of GDP) reaching its peak in the third quarter. The government cash surplus is negative on impact which is equivalent to being a net borrower (-0.28 % of GDP) and continually getting worse. Finally, the government outstanding debt increases following the shock (1.07% of GDP), accumulating more than 8% of GDP over a year and a half. 
Robustness
In the baseline model, we estimate the PVAR model using four lags based on the AIC (with quarterly data). In this section, we expand the lag length to six and eight lags, to generate the corresponding impulse-response function and cumulative impact. For both sub-samples, results are to a large extent robust and similar to the four lags estimations. However, for the developed countries sample, estimates of the cumulative impact on revenues appears to be sensitive to the number of lags used, while for the developing countries sample, results for payments are apparently not robust. The impulse-response graphs from a model with eight lags are shown in Figure 2A and 2B, and their cumulative impacts are reported in Table 5A and 5B.
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In addition, we split the developing countries subsample into upper-middle income and lower-middle income countries. Figure 3A and 3B show their impulse-response graphs and Table 6A and 6B report their cumulative impacts. We find that in the cumulative impact, procyclical fiscal policy is to large extent stronger in the lower-income developing countries, suggesting a decreasing ability to use fiscal policy to withstand external negative shocks that is associated with lower income. 
Fiscal projections for 2 prototypical cases
One of the purposes for this work is to equip policy makers with an estimate of the likely impact of a large natural disaster on their government accounts. Since different countries have different vulnerabilities to disasters-both in terms of occurrence probabilities, and the different disaster scales, we calculate for several countries the average magnitude of a 2-standard-deviations disaster and from that calculate the disaster's likely fiscal impact. The disaster data for specific countries are presented in table 7 while the cumulative fiscal impacts are presented in table 8. 
Policy conclusions
We estimated the fiscal consequences of natural disasters using quarterly fiscal data for a panel of 22 developed and 20 developing countries for 1990-2005 using VARs, as in Burnside et al. (2004) . In our estimations, we employ a panel VAR framework that also controls for the business cycle and was developed by Love and Zicchino (2006) . We find fiscal behavior in the aftermath of disasters to be different between developed and developing countries. In developed countries, governments seem to be 'leaning against the wind' and increasing spending and cutting taxes following a large disaster event. On the other hand, fiscal policy in developing countries can best be described as pro-cyclical; with governments largely decreasing spending and increasing revenues in the aftermath of large natural disaster events.
While we cannot conclude anything about the reasons behind this differentiated behavior, we observe that this counter-intuitive pro-cyclical fiscal policy in developing countries is well documented in other contexts, most recently by Ilzetzki and Végh (2008) . These findings suggest an extra urgency to develop insurance mechanisms that will enable governments to insure against these adverse fiscal consequences. This need is especially acute in developing countries, since the pro-cyclical policy adopted in the aftermath of the disaster leads to further and deeper adverse macro-economic outcomes as a result of these events.
Our quantitative results suggest the exact amount of coverage that governments need to accumulate to insure against these adverse outcomes. For example, given the results we present in table 8, we suggest that given past experiences, the Indonesian government should insure itself, perhaps through the issuance of CAT bonds, to a larger extent than the Philippine government. These are preliminary results, and while suggestive, a mechanism to measure more precisely the amount of insurance needed to account for both the occasional large scale disaster together with frequent smaller disasters needs to be developed.
Once we obtain a benchmark for the likely fiscal dynamics after a disaster event, we can also start to examine the determinants of these effects. For example, different public response to disaster damage may depend on the government accountability to the electorate; i.e., more democratic and competitive regimes with freer speech/press and more transparent institutions are likely to respond more aggressively to disasters than countries whose governments are not responsive or accountable to the population. Besley and Burgess (2002) and before them Sen (1980) suggest several hypotheses that can potentially be examined with more detailed fiscal and disaster data, or data at the sub-national level. 
